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Abstract
This paper addresses the key determinants of merger failure, in particular
the role of innovation (post-merger performance) and technology (ex-ante
selection) when firms decide to separate. After a brief review of the existing
literature we introduce a model of process innovation where merged firms
exibit intra-merger spillover of knowledge under different market regimes,
depending on whether firms integrate vertically or horizontally. Secondly,
we describe an ideal matching pattern for ex-ante selection criteria of tech-
nological partnering, abstracting from financial market power issues. In a
final section we test the model implications for merger failure for M&A data
from the US biotechnology industry in the 90s. We find that post-merger
innovation performance, in particular with large spillovers, increases the
probability of survival, while we have no evidence that market power ef-
fects do so in long run. Additionally, we find extensive technology sourcing
activity by firms (already in the 90s) which contradicts the notion of failure
and suits well the open innovation paradigm.
JEL-class. O30, L22, L25, C78, L65
keywords: merger failure, innovation performance, technology, matching, open innovation,
biotechnology
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1 Introductory note
With the end of Daimler Chrysler decade another "world company" resolved
back into its national components. As the Daimler CEO Zetsche states, ratios
for the demerger where to be found in "constantly decreasing synergies within the
merger", next to the capital market risks related to ongoing financial transfers to
support Chryslers lossy production. The former argument is mostly associated
with supply side economies of scale and scope in the merged organization and
production in the early merger stages. Anyhow, in our study we investigate that
the post merger evolution of technology, i.e. technological synergies, may in the
long run become a key aspect why former partners separate .
Increasing overall numbers of Multinational Enterprises (MNE), growing vol-
umes of FDI and volumes of trade are persistent phenomena in the process of
globalization (Narula and Zanfei 2003, OECD 2007). Multiple attempts have
been made to construct efficient "world companies" that can master survival in
global competition. International activities reflect that firms are less focused on
national resources of production than they were some years before. In particular,
the strategic orientation of R&D processes has recently been subject to change
(Blanc and Sierra 1999; Granstrand et al. 1993; von Zedtwitz and Gassmann
2002): Some firms opt for new business models such as Open Innovation (Hippel
and Krogh 2006; West and Chesbrough 2006) which explicitly tries to capture and
complement knowledge sources external to the firm to internal ones, as new combi-
nations of technological components (e.g. Fleming 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida
2003) may lead to successful further development in the invention process. Hence,
these firms engage in screening and sensing (international) technology markets
for new potential resources, and cooperate with partners e.g. through alliances,
licensing or mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For the latter, the extent of search
processes and subsequent selection of partner are partly subject to commitment
and strategic beliefs of firms regarding the general value of technological capabil-
ities (Langlois 1992) for success and their own absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990).
Next to non-technological arguments which clarify the original merger deci-
sion such as the managers Hybris motive or capital market based ratios (Mueller
2003; Gugler et al. 2006) for behaviour, there is a technological perspective for
M&A activity (Hall 1988) where firms source for knowledge globally or locally,
and, that not exclusively relates to efficiencies in production or competition ef-
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fects in post merger markets (Kleinert and Klodt 2002).
In contrast, we suggest that demerger decisions are grounded more deeply in
verificable, rationalized facts like innovative or product market performance in
the intraperiod of merger existence, and can also be to some extent referred and
quantified by the evolution of technology, at least in high-tech industries, as it
is well established that demerger may go along with the risk of negative stock
market evaluation (e.g. Agrawal et al. 1992), organization reconstruction or even
delisting (costs).
Merger targets and acquiring firms typically can be characterized e.g. by size,
being small respectively large, or by construction, being vertical or horizontal.
In terms of technology, partner choice and post merger innovative performance
has been studied intensively by several contributions in the ultimate years: Most
of the papers utilize technological relatedness / proximity between partners to
describe the relation between technological portfolios of merging firms (for Ger-
many: Hussinger 2005; for cross-boarder mergers: Hussinger and Frey 2006), a
concept that brings together per firm (past) patent application counts and tech-
nology classification (Jaffe 1986).
Subsequent innovative performance has been another focus of recent research
(Hagedoorn and Dyuster 2000; Colombo et al. 2005; sector-specific: Stephan and
Gantumur 2007), e.g. by measuring post merger patent intensity, R&D person-
nel and R&D productivity. Other studies combine both approaches, the selection
problem and ex post performance, or most recently investigate competition ef-
fects in regard to technological relatedness (Hussinger and Grimpe 2007).
Demerging unlocks resources, e.g. financial constraints and limited human
resources, for further search processes and internalization of external technologi-
cal knowledge through (inhouse) spillovers (Jaffe 1986), hence demerger may not
necessarily be caused by the lack of post merger innovative performance and in-
sufficient technology evolution, but may be motivated by completed, successful
internalization of technological knowledge, in particular in high-tech industries.
Needless to say, demerger must not bear the connotation of (technological or or-
ganizational) failure of a riskful merger experiment driven by mismanagement,
but may also have a natural date of expiration.
Below discourse addresses the key determinants of merger failure. A second
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question focuses on the particular role of innovation and technology when firms
decide to separate. In section (2) we introduce a model of process innovation
where merged firms exibit intra-merger spillover of knowledge under different
market regimes, depending on whether firms integrate vertically or horizontally.
Section (3) we test the model implications for merger failure for M&A data from
the US biotechnology industry in the 90s, section (4) concludes. We find that
post-merger innovation performance, in particular with large spillovers, increases
the probability of survival, while we have no evidence that market power effects
do so in long run.
2 linkages between merger (failure) and innovation
When merger pairs form and possibly separate they run through a process of
selection and a process of de-selection. To see what really drives these processes
it is necessary to fully understand their motives and causes. The end of a merger
is not necessarily the point in time when investigation should end.
Firstly, the selection process may be initiated by a variety of motives. Pos-
sibly, these may include individual pursuit of managements, increase in market
power or maybe following technology sourcing motives e.g. to amplify a firms
technological profile. The causes that finally govern the selection process may
differ from original motives of the merger, as, in most cases, capital markets and
a firms individual or relative1 financial power on these markets may even change
rational selection decision.
Secondly, the potential process of de-selection is much more complex to anal-
yse as only one of the primary sources causing failure may lie in a posteriori
misled selection process. General production performance, that is production
synergies from post-merger economies of scale and scope, or when focusing on
innovation performance, potential process and / or product innovation success,
again, by increases in R&D efficiency via scale and scope economies, via a reduc-
tion of substitutional research, or via intra-merger spillovers by mutual learning
processes in the common labs that, for the case of process innovation, may have
product quality-enhancing or production cost-reducing effects. Next to selection
and performance causes of demerger, failure may be well intended and can be
motivated i.e. by technological restructuring of a company. Still, other motives
1The balance between the acquisors and targets financial power i.e. plays a role if the merger
is a hostile takeover. Similarly, several acquisors may bid for an interesting target candidate.
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to separate include traditionally unexpected failed, bad performance or drastic
changes in the market environment itself2.
2.1 the role of genetic codes of technology and integration
choice: market dominance, post-merger performance
and merger failure
Grounded on the basic insights of the model from Kamien and Zang (1999, in the
following KZ) we develop a two stage game in which a newly formed merger cou-
ple can perfom process innovations under different levels of market concentration.
On the models first stage the merger entity decides on common R&D investment,
then, on a second stage it optimally sets prices and quantities for a given market
structure. As all this happens in the post-merger phase, technological codes of
merging partners are predefined, that is exogenously given. Still, these codes
define the level of intra-merger spillovers due to the level of the partners individ-
ual (technological) experience, technological proximity of partners (Jaffe 1986)
and common R&D effort of the merger couple (Kim 1998). Referencing on the
absorptive capacity paradigma from Cohen and Levinthal (1990) KZ propose a
representation of a firms effective R&D effort that incorporates absorptive capac-
ity as a strategic variable, which we take here as predefined and which we will
review in the next section, into their research joint venture model. Specifically,
they propose that the i-th firms effective R&D effort X be represented by
Xi = χi + (1− δi)(1− δj)βχδii χ1−δij . (1)
In our post-merger scenario, given that partners invest symmetrically, the intra-
merger spillovers that additionally, with rate ξ, empower the investment level x
of the merger pair summarize to
X = x[1 + (1− δi)(1− δj)β] = ξx (2)
with χi = χj and x = 2χi. χi respectively χj refers to each partners own R&D
expenditure level or reduction in its unit production costs, with 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1,
0 ≤ δj ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Now the exogenously given parameter β is the
fraction of one partners R&D effort that virtually spills over to other partners
R&D efforts. In the general joint venture literature it represents the involuntary
2These changes in framework conditions of the market maybe caused i.e. by disruptive
technologies developed by a third party firm, changes in market regulation or unexpected shift
of demand.
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spillovers from a partners R&D activity that it has only a limited ability to curtail,
such as the information disclosed when patents are granted, information provided
in trade and scientific publications, information provided through reverse engi-
neering, information disclosed through the migration of employees, suppliers, and
customers, and industry-wide rumors and gossip. In our context, we re-interpret
the parameter as a measure of technological proximity (Hussinger 2005) between
merging partners that restricts or enhances well-intended, intra-merger spillovers,
basically saying that partners with technologically closer competences can learn
faster and more profound from each other as they are carriers of similar tech-
nological regimes (Nelson and Winter 1977; Marsili and Verspagen 2002) and
most probably employ members of the same / a similar technological community
(Rappa and Debackere 1992).
The term δ, on the other hand, refers to the endogenous control the i-th
partner can exert on the spillovers its R&D activity generates through the choice
of an R&D approach. A very narrow, firm-specific approach corresponds to δ = 1
and generates no spillovers to others because the information it provides is to
some extent irrelevant to them, it can only hardly be decoded and learned. On
the other hand, it also limits the firms absorptive capacity. At the other extreme,
a totally non-specific approach, i.e. a basic approach, corresponds to δ = 0
and generates the maximum spillover to others but also maximizes the firms
absorptive capacity for any level of its R&D spending. Again, as we treat δ as
a non-strategic, exogenous parameter, each partners absorptive capacity (AC) is
predefinded, so that for partner i respectively j, with symmetric investment, it is
given that
ACi = (1− δi)χδii (3)
and
ACj = (1− δj)χδjj = (1− δj)χδji . (4)
In the merger context, absorptive capacities reflect the individual potentials for
successful technological integration of merging partners, and, hence, may offer a
first ex ante criteria for profound analysis on technological synergies developed
in the post-merging innovation perfomance phase.
When solving the model recursively, we assume a simple, Cournot competition
market model where the merger couple faces an inverse, linear demand function,
p = a−Q, with an overall merger output of Q, given that a > Q ≥ 0. Further-
more, without loss of generality, we suppose a negative demand curve slope of -1.
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The mergers profit function piz as modelled by KZ compounds potential process
innovation effects of effective investment reducing common marginal production
costs C(Q,X) - from their initial level of A to somewhere below that level -,
and an exponential, non-negative cost function for R&D effort3, C¯(R&D). More
precisely, it resumes to
piz = pQ− C(Q,X)− C¯(R&D) = pQ− [A−X]Q− 0.5γx2, (5)
with [A−X] ≥ 0 and γ > 0.
Depending on the structure of the market z, z = [mon, duo], the equilibrium
solutions of the game change. Let us suppose that horizontal mergers - more
than vertical ones - are associated with larger, immediate market power, i.e. that
firms merging horizontally may perform in a monopoly structure while vertical
mergers compete with some third party in a duopoly. Then, for the former struc-
ture, solving the profit-maximization problem of the horizontally merging entity
from equation (5) resolves to
max
x
pimon = 1
4
(a− A)2 + 1
4
x[(ξ2 − 2γ)x+ 2ξ(a− A)] (6)
with an optimal, common investment level x˜mon of
x˜mon =
(a− A)ξ
2γ − ξ2 (7)
under monopoly pricing and quantities on the second stage, so that profits sum-
marize to
pimon(x˜mon) = 1
4
{
(a− A)2 + [(a− A)ξ]
2
2γ − ξ2
}
(8)
Analogeously, under a duopoly scheme, with no spillovers to the third party firm
assumed, the profit-maximizing problem of a vertical merger pair on the first
stage is
max
x
piduo = 2
9
(a− A)2 + 2
9
x[(ξ2 − 9
4
γ)x+ 2ξ(a− A)]. (9)
Again, the optimal R&D effort x˜duo derived from the F.O.C. is
x˜duo =
(a− A)ξ
9
4
γ − ξ2 (10)
3Note that throughout the model it is assumed that different R&D approaches rely on similar
R&D cost functions.
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respectively, for maxmial profit
piduo(x˜duo) = 2
9
{
(a− A)2 + [(a− A)ξ]
2
9
4
γ − ξ2
}
. (11)
It is easy to see (eqs. (8) and (11)) that profits under the monopoly scheme are
somewhat higher, given identical parameters in both markets, than in a duopoly
market, put differently it is always the case pimon(x˜mon) > piduo(x˜duo). Anyhow,
considering investment incentives under each market regime, x˜z, it is interesting
that even though potential amortization of process innovation efforts seem to be
higher due to the larger scale of production as a duopolist, they are outweighed
by the option of the monopoly pricing margin as a direct transfer mechanism of
R&D costs to consumers4.
H 1: For an identical set of parameters [a,A, γ, ξ] in both market structures,
the immediate effect of market power on profits is higher for horizontal merger
than for firms merging vertically, given that above market structure - integration
type - assumption holds. Hence, horizontal integration may decrease the risk of
merger failure in the long-run while vertical integration generates a lower proba-
bility of survival.
We find that generated profits from market power may crucially depend on the
intra-merger spillover effects ξ(δi, δj, β) on process innovations whatever type of
merger one considers, when keeping all other parameters [a,A, γ] fixed. Then, it
may be even the case that due to large spillovers the acquisor may wish to opt for
a vertical rather than horizontal partnering firm / target as the market power ef-
fect is overpowered by the effectiveness of R&D investment on process innovation
and, hence, drastic increases in profits. Conclusively, it will become important
to elaborate on how merger pairs should be formed that maximize spillovers - if
we abstract from the market integration issue-, and, hence, make common R&D
efforts more effective and help increase profits from process innovations.
H2: For larger (smaller) values of ξ, that is higher (lower) levels of intra-
merger spillovers, the effectiveness of R&D effort is enhanced (reduced) so that
the altitude of process innovations and, hence, joint profits should increase (de-
crease). From a dynamic perspective, this may lower (increase) the probability of
merger failure.
4These structural results are in the Schumpeterian line of reasoning that more concentrated
markets lead to higher levels of innovation.
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Different to the KZ model where firms set R&D approaches strategically for
the purposes of successful joint venture in research on an additional stage of the
model, we apply exogenously set R&D approaches as a key (technological) char-
acteristic in the (strategic) selection process for finding the adequate merging
partner, for a given technological proximity of partners. Firms with different
R&D approaches are either high or low types, which in our model translates
to broader, respectively narrow approaches (smaller or larger δ). Basically, the
selection process points towards certain, optimal patterns of matching and tech-
nology sourcing (Malerba and Orsenigo 1993) which we will investigate on in the
following section.
2.2 positive assortative matching patterns: the role of genetic
codes of technology for merger selection and failure
Suppose, we have two types5, δ′i > δi and δ
′
j > δj, for each firm i and j as
binary gender (either acquisors or targets) in a two-sided model with assortative
matching (Legros and Newman 2007, in the following LN). Let I be the set of
acquisors on one side of the market and let J be the set of targeted firms on
the other. The description of a specific economy6 includes an assignment of
individuals to types via maps ρ : I → P and α : J → A, where P and A are
compact subsets of R. To simplify the exposition, we assume that I and J have
the same cardinality. The joint R&D payoff function of the matched merger pair
is described by the level of spillover exibited due to common R&D effort (eq. (2)),
so that the firm-specific utility maxmimization problem φ for firm i in finding the
optimal matching partner simplifies to
φ(δi, δj, s) = max
δj ,s
(1− s)ξx (12)
s.t. s =
ACj
ACi + ACj
(13)
with the sharing rule s, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, that is implicitely contracted by the predefined
absorbtive capacities of each partner (eqs. (3) and (4)). The utility share firm i
gets from exibited spillovers is (1−s) while firm j gets a share of s. Obviously, for
5De facto we observe the discrete case with a continuum of types.
6Two further assumptions are generally made on matching models, namely (1) that the payoff
possibilities depend only on the types of the agents and not on their individual identities, and
(2) the utility possibilities of the pair of agents do not depend on what other agents in the
economy are doing, that is, there are no externalities across coalitions.
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non-symmetric cases of ACs firms then profit very differently from spillover effect
inside the merger, when, from an evolutionary perspective7, i.e. the potentials
to learn from each others technological competences vary. Put differently, the
difference in the pace of learning may lead to an asymmetric technological inte-
gration success in short- or mid-term run that may be perceived - at least from
the partner with minor AC potentials - as a minor level of technological synergies
in individual, post-merging innovation performance while the higher AC firm may
benefit from this particular formation, even though product market profits from
common, median process innovation altitude are assumed to remain unchanged
in the long run8.
H3: With significantly different absorptive capacities of merging partners shar-
ing of exibited intra-merger spillovers is asymmetric as they learn at a different
speed from each other, which may enforce merger failure in the (early or mid-
term) phases of technological integration.
Ideally, the selection process of merging firms should lead to a positive assor-
tative matching (PAM) pattern, that is high (low) types will match with high
(low) types, as this should maximize spillovers and, hence, altitude of process
innovation. This is the case if firm i's utility function from exibited spillover
(eqs. (12) and (13)), and analogously firm j's, are increasing (or more precisely,
non-decreasing) in type, in other words, if matching with a broader R&D ap-
proach partner this should increase the joint spillover payoff. So given that below
equations hold
φ1(δi, δj, s) ≤ 0 (14)
φ1(δi, δj, s) = (s− 1)(1− δj)xβ − s′x [1 + (1− δi)(1− δj)β] ≤ 0 (15)
and
φ2(δi, δj, s) ≤ 0 (16)
φ2(δi, δj, s) = (s− 1)(1− δi)xβ − s′x [1 + (1− δi)(1− δj)β] ≤ 0, (17)
7Rather than focusing on profit-maxmizing product market orientation, this perspective
considers the evolution of merger cooperation and its implications for post-merger innovation
performance.
8Please note that our application of the KZ model does not explicitly consider a specific
post-merger phases of technological integration activity. Still, it may be quite useful to think
of i.e. post-merger period of re-organization of R&D facilities, general learning on mutual skills
and developing a set-up of a common R&D agenda.
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individual payoff functions are type increasing as
s′ > 0, (18)
if, and only if
1− δj ≥ 1
ln(x
2
)
, 1− δi ≥ 1
ln(x
2
)
(19)
which basically requests that a certain level of common R&D effort is made for
spillover effects to unfold fully inside the merger.
Additionally, sufficient conditions for PAM according to the generalized increasing
difference conditions suggested by LN must satisfy
φ12(δi, δj, s) ≥ 0 (20)
φ12(δi, δj, s) = −(s−1)xβ+s′xβ [(1− δi) + (1− δj)]−s′′x[1+(1−δi)(1−δj)β] ≥ 0,
(21)
and
φ13(δi, δj, s) ≥ 0 (22)
φ13(δi, δj, s) = s
′(1− δj)xβ − s′′x[1 + (1− δi)(1− δj)β] ≥ 0. (23)
If eqs. (18) and (19) hold, then it easy to show that s′′ ≤ 0. Generally speaking,
condition (20) secures type-type complementarity as commonly used in matching
models, while condition (22) secures an additional type-payoff complementarity
that guarantees PAM, even in those cases with type-related, limited (or non-)
transferability of utilities where agents may be limited in the bidding competi-
tion for the higher type partner.
In our context, the implications from the ideal PAM result suggest that for
the technology sourcing firm searching for the right partner, technologically most
proximate firms with more narrow R&D approaches and firms with broader R&D
approaches should match. Technologically-driven merger selection whose success
or failure crucially depends on post-merger innovation performance must consider
the potential effects of spillovers as well as the aspect of sharing / absorbing these
effects in the integration phase.
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3 testing
3.1 data description
In order to test the derived hypotheses H1-3 we develop a data set of 3804 M&A
deals in the US biotechnology sector, as a high-tech and innovation-driven in-
dustry, for the period from 1990 to 2000, excluding cross-boarder transactions,
and also well before international stock crisis right after the turn of the century.
Additionally, we explicitely focus on those deals in the THOMPSON c©SDC Plat-
inum M&A data bank where full legal ownership changed from target to aquiror,
that is i.e. 100 % stakes were transferred. The data supplies date of acquisition,
industry classification of targets, respectively acquisors, and some general infor-
mation on primary business activities of both parties. 44 of these deals could be
identified as being cases of de-merger for the observed period of time. The rate of
failure may seem too low and may contradict other studies on the issue (see for
example Porter (1987) who assumes about 50% of mergers to fail) at first sight,
but as we assumed that de-merging was present when targets re-appeared9 on
the M&A market for technology after being acquised in the first place, numbers
become more reasonable. Most probably, we still may have a certain bias in our
data as we solely considers divesture cases where the re-acquised target still had
some technological value for others, and we cannot identify those merger failures
e.g. were the merger was delisted or even went bankrupt. Figure 1 presents the
survival time of these failure cases for the biotechnology industry in comparison
to merger life cycles we found in other US high-tech sectors. Table 1 summarizes
the biotechnology sample used in the next section.
vertical
mergers
horizontal
mergers
overall no.
failure cases 31 13 44
survival cases 2632 1128 3760
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of US biotechnology domestic mergers (1990-2000)
sample. Horizontal merger if target and acquiror have identical SIC / industry
class., vertical formation is otherwise assumed.
The cases of merger failure identified were supplemented by a sample of sur-
viving mergers that was drafted randomly, and, both are matched to a separate,
extensive patent analysis of 68 companys patent portfolios with USPTO patent
data. For the latter analysis we exclusively focused on (US) patent applications -
9It is assumed that with the second transaction date the failing merger ends.
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Figure 1: Life cycle / survival time of failed domestic mergers in the US biotech-
nology, electronics, computer and communication industries, 1990-2000.
as an indicator of the present margin of a firms innovation activity and the firms
profile of central technological competences - and, we also assumed a constant de-
preciation rate of knowledge of .15 when calculating actual patent stocks of each
company. Each individual application is assigned to a technology class according
to the International Patent Classification (IPC) that covers eight different tech-
nology fields, A-H, and an extensive sub-categorization where, for the purpose of
our analysis, we applied the 4-digit level. In order to control for the importance of
the individual patent classes for the firm the percentage of the firms total patent
application stock is used rather than absolute numbers. Relative stocks in each
sub-category then map the conclusive technological profile / vector of each firm.
Technological proximity β between two firms i and j is defined as the angular
separation or uncentered correlation measure. Based on their technology vectors
Fi and Fj technological relatedness is calculated as
β =
FiFj√
(F ′iFj)(FiF
′
j)
(24)
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Additionally, we measure the narrowness / broadness of R&D approaches δ of
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a firm i by its entropy regarding specific scientific fields l (Grupp 1997), that is
a compound measure for concentration of a company's innovation activities in
terms of broadness and intensity
δi = −
∑
l
pli ln pli, (25)
where pli is the share of activities of i in patent class sub-category l, given the
secondary condition that
∑
l
plk = 1 holds. Hence, in the case that activities are
concentrated in only one IPC field the entropy index is δi = 0, while for an
equidistribution of shares in all relevant subcategories the entropy level simplifies
to δi = − ln(1l ).
3.2 estimation and results
For testing our merger survival hypotheses we use a Cox proportional hazard
model that estimates the probability of survival past time t. It also has the
property that it leaves the baseline hazard unparameterized h0(t), that is there
is no assumption about the shape of the hazard over time. This semiparametric
model, with coeffients ω′k and variables xu, is of the general form
h(t|x) = h0(t) exp(ω′kxu) (26)
Furthermore, we integrate dynamic measures for rates of change (pre- vs. post-
merger perfomance10) in absolute numbers of patents and in joint entropy of
the merger pairs [entro-rate; patnum-rate], as covariates exponentially varying
over time. All other static variables [sic-market; proxi; entro-diff; both-entropy]
are treated as fixed in the model. After running the estimation (table 2), we
test the proportional hazard assumptions based on Schoenfeld residuals (see ap-
pendix, table 3) to secure the general validity / non-violation of the global model.
Estimation results suggest that we have no evidence that market power /
market relatedness effects play a significant role for demerger [sic-market]. That
is saying, matching vertically - having a different SIC industry classification -
does not restrict the probability of survival, so H1 can be rejected. This suits
well the notion that the effect itself may be a more immediate than long-term
one. Alternatively, the above assumption on market power - integration type that
10Innovation performance for failure cases is measured for the period of merger duration and
for a similar period ex ante, while for non-failure cases we observe four-years performance ex
ante including the merger birthdate, respectively ex post.
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_t Coef. Std. Err. Haz. Ratio
rh
proxi -3.018952† 1.09849 .0488524†
sic-market .0001819 .0002688 1.000182
entro-diff .3539174 .5812657 1.424637
both-entropy .1228839 .2605835 1.130753
entro-rate 24.19165 21.30897 3.21e+10
patnum-rate -4.511153† 2.044494 .0109858†
t
entro-rate -3.156823 2.938956 .0425607
patnum-rate .5596401† .2747942 1.750042†
N = 34, time at risk = 46,578, χ2 = 20.96, † = 95% conf. interval
Table 2: semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model
forms the basis for H1 may be violated.
For H2 the evidence is much harder to grasp fully as the level of spillovers depends
on the common broadness of R&D approaches [both-entropy] and technological
proximity of merging partners [proxi]. Partly, it must be rejected as entropy
measures have no significant impact on hazard rates, even when we adjust for
technological proximity. On the other hand, proximity of partners seems to re-
duce the separation risk as more proximate merger pairs have a hazard of failure
that is only about 5 % of the hazard for those who have very technologically
distant competence profiles. Intuitively, this results suggest that proximity is en-
hancing intra-merger knowledge spillovers but it maybe also attributed to some
extent to an increase of R&D effiencies inside the merger where similar com-
petences, and hence, R&D resources - clearing of substitutional research - are
refocused on existing complementary or new fields of R&D. Hence, H2 is, at least
partly, satisfied but still needs further investigation.
Asymmetry in absorbtive capacities has no significant impact on hazard rates,
so that H3 must be rejected. As asymmetry [entro-diff] is an ex ante criteria
with only early integration stage influence it is of minor importance for long-term
failure decisions. Anyhow, lets keep in mind that some of the criteria of selection
seem to be essential for the separation process.
Turning to the more post-merger performance orientated criteria, indicators
[entro-rate; patnum-rate] suggest that changes in joint entropy are not significant
while the effect of absolute patent application number rates is somewhat puzzling.
If we treat the rate as a fixed variable in the model we get the general notion that
a good innovation performance, indicated by an (100%) increase in applications,
should reduce the risk of failure, that is the relative hazard is only 1%. Oppo-
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sitely, if we assume the variable to vary over time, as we really should expect,
the hazard for high-patenting mergers is about 75% higher than the hazard of a
minor performance pair. With respect to the data context here (our definition
of failure cases) it may be the case that high-performance becomes an indica-
tor of a successful absorption process of the partners technological competences
where failure is only a strategic re-orientation of management. The finalization
of such a technological sourcing proceedure in the data contradicts the commonly
acknowledged notion of bad innovation performance as a cause for failure.
4 conclusive remarks
Federal or European policies of merger control have been mostly concerned with
protecting consumer rents from post merger reaping of extra profits from in-
creased market power. If we consider the economic logic of technology sourcing
this view may well be short-sighted. Given that mergers are expected to be tem-
porary constructs internalizing technology, and, can be identified ex ante by the
authorities, short-term product market profits should not be the only decision
principle. Long-term macro effects for sustainable growth in the whole industry
that are driven by successful technological change via spillover and increasing
innovation may overcompensate the latter effects for consumers.
Similarly, a broader evaluation scheme by stock market analyst can now turn out
to be positive, with respect to the technological potential for future firm growth
enhanced by demerger. However, the original merger partner choice, whether
technologically proximate firms are selected or not, and the continuing analysis
of post-merger performance, based on the revealed patterns from Hypotheses (2),
should have an impact on firm selection itself and, possibly, stay or exit strategies
inserted by managers.
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5 appendix
rho chi2 df Prob>chi2
proxi -0.56779 7.00 1 0.0082
sic-market 0.44505 6.34 1 0.0118
entro-diff 0.37359 5.94 1 0.0148
both-entropy 0.31318 2.69 1 0.1010
entro-rate 0.05758 0.07 1 0.7955
patnum-rate 0.15558 0.32 1 0.5690
entro-rate -0.08776 0.17 1 0.6793
patnum-rate -0.19614 0.54 1 0.4637
global test 15.53 8 0.0496
Table 3: hazard assumptions global test by Schoenfeld residuals
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